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Characterization of the Legislative Veto: Courts Should
Focus on The Power Itself
The legislative veto' has become the subject of renewed aca-
demic debate.2 Commentators were previously concerned with the
veto provisions' utility' and constitutionality. Discussion currently
centers around the question of whether the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha has invalidated all federal veto provisions.6 This
1. The term legislative veto is used generically to describe a resolution by Congress to
override or cancel a particular decision or rule of an administrative agency, or occasionally,
an executive decision. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. REV. 569 (1953). Apparently, the term was used
initially in Millett & Rogers, The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization Act of 1939, 1
Pus. AD. REV. 176 (1941). See Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A
Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
Procedurally, veto provisions are of two basic types. Those requiring a vote by one house
of Congress are known as simple resolutions, and those requiring a vote by both houses are
called concurrent resolutions. Ginnane, supra, at 570 n.1. See also Saks, Holding the Inde-
pendent Agencies Accountable: Legislative Veto of Agency Rules, 36 AD. L. REv. 41 (1984).
This distinction may be important to the question of whether article I scrutiny is required,
Ginnane, supra at 569, but, both types would be treated identically with regard to the dis-
cussion herein.
Veto provisions are found in the text of the act for which they are created. They appear in
numerous federal statutes. See generally Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983); Schwartz, supra, at 351; Levinson, Legislative and
Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 38 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 79, 79-80 (1982). But cf. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. § 13 (1982) (adding §§
801-803 to Title 5, U.S.C.) (Congress may veto proposed agency rules by concurrent resolu-
tion without submission to the President).
2. See infra notes 3-4.
3. Debate on the question of the veto's utility in administrative control has continued.
See, e.g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional
Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legisla-
tive Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 455 (1977).
4. For a comprehensive list of discussions on the general constitutionality of legislative
vetos, see Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12 (White, J., dissenting).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act uncon-
stitutional). Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2788
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice White filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 2792 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice White joined. Id.
at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. In Chadha, Justice Powell expressed the opinion that the Court, by its broad rea-
soning, had invalidated all legislative vetoes. Id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
White agreed with this point, id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting), but expressed some hope
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comment is not concerned with either the utility or constitutional-
ity, per se, of the legislative veto; rather, it seeks to expose a prob-
lem found in two of the federal cases in which the validity of a veto
was in question.7
An initial and accurate determination of the character of each
veto provision-as either executive, legislative, or judicial-is es-
sential in defining the legal parameters within which its constitu-
tionality will be judged. In making this determination, the courts
have concentrated on the effects of an exercise of that power,
rather than focusing on the nature of the power itself.8
The impact of this characterization of a legislative veto may be
illustrated by the divergent positions of the majority and concur-
ring opinions in Chadha. In Chadha, the Supreme Court declared
the veto provision in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA)' unconstitutional. 10 The majority held that
Congress' exercise of the INA veto violated the constitutional re-
quirements for legislative enactment: bicameral consideration and
presidential presentment.1 Justice Powell found, in his concur-
rence, that section 244(c)(2) was indeed unconstitutional, 2 but on
the theory that Congress' exercise of the veto constituted an im-
that the Court may have avoided this result. See id. at 2796 n.11 (White, J., dissenting).
For general views with regard to the effect of Chadha on other legislative veto provisions,
see, e.g., After Chadha, A Legal Void, NAT'L LAW J., April 23, 1984 at 1, col.1; Tolchun,
Legislative Veto Thrives Despite Court Ruling, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 26, 1983, at 3, col.1;
Congress Has Post-Chadha Legislative Veto Options, LEGAL TimEs, Dec. 5, 1983, at 12,
col.1.
7. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Atkins
v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 36, 37 & 39-42.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
10. 103 S. Ct. at 2788.
11. Id. at 2787. The requirements of bicameral consideration and presidential present-
ment are embodied in Article I of the United States Constitution: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). "Every
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States. Id. at art. I, § 7, cl.
2 (emphasis added).
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Ef-
fect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limi-
tations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
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permissible violation of the separation of powers doctrine.13 The
differing analyses presented in these opinions stem from differing
conclusions as to the character of the veto, or more particularly,
the character of the power as exercised by Congress in utilizing the
veto.'4 In Chadha, Chief Justice Burger determined that, by utiliz-
ing section 244(c)(2), Congress exercised a legislative power.'6 Jus-
tice Powell, on the other hand, found that Congress was acting in a
judicial manner.'"
Without having first made such a determination, no decision re-
garding constitutionality could be made; the possible constitutional
violations could not have been discerned. 17 A conclusion that Con-
gress acted within its designated area would indicate no violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. Then, however, an analysis of
the individual proscriptions of article I of the Constitution would
be mandated.'" An initial determination that Congress had as-
sumed a judicial responsibility, on the other hand, would necessi-
tate finding that the veto is impermissible within the broader
framework of the separation of powers doctrine, with no further
analysis required.19
Because a characterization of any congressional action as nonleg-
islative indicates a violation of the separation of powers doctrine,20
13. Id. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, having decided the question of
constitutionality, vel non, on the basis of an infringement of the separation of powers doc-
trine, found it unnecessary to reach the presentment and bicameralism issues. Id.
Further, Justice Powell reasoned that the Court would have more properly narrowed the
scope of its decision by adhering to his analysis. Id. at 2788-89 (Powell, J., concurring). See
also supra note 6.
14. Compare 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring) (Congress assumed a judicial
function), with id. at 2784 (Congress acted within the legislative sphere). That both opinions
reached an ultimate finding of unconstitutionality is immaterial to this discussion, as either
result is possible after the characterization is made. For example, Justice White, in his dis-
sent, reached the conclusion that § 244(c)(2) does not violate the bicameralism and present-
ment provisions of article I, and is therefore constitutional. He made this determination by
finding that Congress had exercised a legislative power. Id. at 2792-2811 (White, J.,
dissenting).
15. Id. at 2784-86.
16. Id. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., id. at 2784 ("[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. [sic]").
18. Id. at 2781. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19. See 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated: "In my view,
when Congress undertook to apply its rules to Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its constitu-
tionally prescribed authority. I would not reach the broader question whether legislative
vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses." Id. But cf. id. at 2781 (the bicameral
and presentment clauses "are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of
powers"). Id.
20. But cf. infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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the general inquiries made under that doctrine are applicable
first.21 As pointed out by Justice Powell in his Chadha concur-
rence, there are two ways the doctrine may be violated:22 interfer-
ence with the performance of another branch's duties, or assump-
tion of governmental functions properly exercisable only by
another branch.'3 Justice Powell correctly identified the "assumed
function" problem as relevant in the legislative veto setting.'
Moreover, the inclusion of the veto in any act is not merely an
assumption by Congress of the right to exercise some power; it is,
in fact, the assumption of that power, itself.
Before Chadha, only one federal court had established a test for
characterizing the power involved in a legislative veto provision.' 5
In Atkins v. United States,6 the Federal Court of Claims held
that the Senate's exercise of the legislative veto provision in the
Federal Salary Act of 1967 (Salary Act)' 7 did not constitute a legis-
lative action.'8
Atkins involved a dispute over judicial compensation.' 9 In 1973,
the President made a recommendation that federal judges receive
7.5% pay increases pursuant to section 225(h) of the Salary Act s°
in 1974, 1975 and 1976.31 On March 6, 1973, the Senate disap-
proved this recommendation by exercising its veto as authorized
by section 225(i)(1)(B) of the Salary Act.32 The judges involved,
21. 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. Justice Powell noted: "Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One
branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally as-
signed function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to another. This case presents the latter situation."
Id. (citations omitted). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (impermissible interference). And see Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189 (1928) (improperly assumed function).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2790.
25. For a discussion of methods of determining the character of state veto provisions,
see Comment, The Legislative Veto: Is it Legislation?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 172 (1981).
26. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
27. Federal Salary Act of 1967, § 225(i)(1)(B). 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1982) (either
House of Congress may veto presidential salary recommendations).
28. 556 F.2d at 1063. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. The United States
Supreme Court had not directly addressed the issue of the constitutionality of legislative
vetoes prior to Chadha. See Saks, supra note 2, at 44.
29. 556 F.2d at 1033.
30. 2 U.S.C. § 358 (1982).
31. 556 F.2d at 1033.
32. 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1976) provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this section, all or part (as the case may
Vol. 22:927930
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having been denied the pay raise, filed suit against the govern-
ment.33 Had Congress not availed itself of the veto, the President's
recommendations would have become law, and the pay increases
would have been initiated.-4 But, because Congress vetoed the
guidelines, the salary levels were controlled by existing legisla-
tion.35 In analyzing the character of the veto provision, the court
looked to the effect of the Senate's action on existing legislation,
and found none. 6 Thus, the court determined that Congress' veto
did not "alter the law," and so, was not legislative.3 7 This analysis
is clearly circular and unreliable. The particular veto provision in
question allowed Congress to reject a Presidential recommendation
which, had it not been vetoed, would itself have "altered the
law."38
In Chadha, the Court purported to utilize an effect test also, 9
but examined the effect of the veto's exercise on those individuals
involved, rather than on the law, as did the Atkins court.40 In de-
fining its test, the Court said, "[w]hether actions taken by either
House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends
not on their form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and
be) of the recommendations of the President transmitted to the Congress in the
budget under section 358 of this title shall become effective at the beginning of the
first pay period which begins after the thirtieth day following the transmittal of such
recommendations in the budget; but only to the extent that, between the date of
transmittal of such recommendations in the budget and the beginning of such first
pay period-
(B) neither House of the Congress has enacted legislation which specifically disap-
proves all or part of such recommendations ...
Id. (amended by 2 U.S.C. § 359(1) (1982)).
33. 556 F.2d at 1033. This action involved 140 United States circuit and district court
judges. Id.
34. Id. at 1034. See also supra note 32.
35. 556 F.2d at 1064.
36. Id. at 1063. See also Comment, supra note 25, at 178-79.
37. 556 F.2d at 1063. Because of this non-legislative characterization, the Atkins court
found no violation of the bicameral provision of article I. Id. In spite of Congress' extra-
legislative action, the Court of Claims upheld the constitutionality of the veto, stating that
the separation of powers doctrine was flexible enough to allow it. Id. at 1070.
38. Id. at 1064. A non-exercise by Congress would have had legislative effect. See also
Comment, supra note 25, at 178-79.
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2784. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. The remainder of the
Court's analysis clearly elevates form over substance in its comparison of procedurally legis-
lative actions that Congress "could have" taken to achieve deportation of Chadha. See 103
S. Ct. at 2785.
40. See supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text.
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effect.' ,
In ascertaining this effect, the Court noted that:
In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to "establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House took action that had the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all
outside the legislative branch.
4 2
From this, the Court concluded that Congress had acted in a legis-
lative manner.43 This analysis is not convincing, because a govern-
mental action properly taken by any branch could have effects
similar to legislation on these individuals."
Closer examination of the particulars of the INA veto, and the
statutory scheme to which the parties were subject, shows an effect
on those involved which would more commonly result from a judi-
cial proceeding.'3 Chadha presents a typical case involving the
INA veto. Jagdish Rai Chadha had been in the United States since
1966, on a nonimmigrant student visa, which expired on June 30,
1972. s On October 11, 1973, Chadha was ordered to show cause
why he should not be deported for staying in the country after his
visa had expired.4 7 Chadha's deportation hearing was held on Jan-
uary 11, 1974, and subsequently adjourned so that he could file an
application under section 244(a)(1) of the INA, s for suspension of
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2784. The Court made no reference to Atkins in this regard.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2785.
44. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 62.
45. See 103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell began his analysis of
the veto's character with the statement that Congress' action was judicial in character by
noting that, "[t]he House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own determination
that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria." Id. at 2791 (Powell,
J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2770.
47. Id.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)(1982) provides:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discre-
tion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General
for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in
paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for
a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of
such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of
good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence.
932
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his deportation. e The application having been filed, Chadha's
hearing was resumed on February 7, 1 97 4 ." On June 25, 1974, the
immigration judge entered an order suspending Chadha's deporta-
tion; ruling on evidence from the hearing, affidavits attached to the
initial application, and findings of an INS character investigation,
the judge found that Chadha met the criteria prescribed in section
244(a)(1),51 so that suspension was warranted.5' The suspension
decision was reported to Congress'3  as required by section
244(c)(1) of the INA. ' Once such report is received by Congress,
section 244(c)(2)35 authorized (prior to Chadha) a single house to
pass a resolution expressing disfavor with the INS's determina-
tion." The House disagreed with the agency's finding that Chadha
met the statutory requirements for suspension and ordered his
deportation .57
Id.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 48.
52. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
53. Id. at 2770-71.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982) provides:
Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the
requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discre-
tion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended
under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the
facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress
with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day
of each calendar month in which Congress is in session.
Id.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). See infra note 56.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) provides:
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
subsection-
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close
of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported,
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in sub-
stance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney Gen-
eral shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at
his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If,
within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation
proceedings.
Id. This is the legislative veto provision of the INA.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2791 (Powell, J., concurring). Although authorized to act on it imme-
diately, the House did not consider a resolution on Chadha's deportation until three days
before the last date on which it could exercise the veto. Id. at 2791 n.6 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). This was a year and one half after the report was submitted. Id.
Along with Chadha, 339 other persons were included in the report presented to Congress.
Id. at 2790 (Powell, J., concurring). Of the 340 listed for suspension of deportation, Congress
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It is clear that the only person whose rights were affected by the
exercise of the veto was Chadha." His status was returned to that
of illegal alien. The "rights, duties and relations"" of the Attorney
General and officials of the INS remained constant, as originally
established by the INA. The Attorney General retained the right
to make a determination of an individual's status within the con-
fines of section 244, with the right to suspend deportation of
proper persons6 ° and the duty to deport those whose status does
not meet that section's requirements. 1 Further, a decision by the
INS to deny suspension of an applicant's deportation would have
the same purpose and effect as the veto itself, an action which the
Court specifically denied legislative character.2
The tests applied in both cases are based on an analysis of the
effect of an exercise of the power embodied in their respective veto
provisions. Although it may be that only upon such exercise can
the veto power be questioned," it is not the exercise of that power
that must be scrutinized to determine its character, but the power
itself.
In Atkins, the initial assumption by Congress of the power to
override the Presidential recommendation should have been ex-
amined. The potential to "alter the law," even through non-exer-
cise, is the real power involved. The court's "effect on the law"
test, is not itself defective;"4 rather the court's focus on the veto's
exercise is inappropriate.
In Chadha, notwithstanding the Court's misapplication of its
"effect" test,65 a more accurate determination of the veto's charac-
ter would have been reached by noting the potential for a change
in an individual alien's status embodied in the provision itself.
resolved to deport six, including Chadha. Id. at 2790-91 (Powell, J., concurring). It is inter-
esting to note that the resolution was not distributed, nor was the vote recorded. Id. at 2791
(Powell, J., concurring).
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
60. By finding the veto provision of section 1254(c)(2) severable from the remainder of
section 1254, the Court preserved that part of the INA authorizing the Attorney General to
suspend deportation pursuant to section 1254(c)(1). See 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). The decision in Chadha had no effect on the remainder of
the INA.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
63. An attempt to challenge the constitutionality of an unexercised legislative veto
would present obvious standing problems, because an injury in fact may be lacking. Id. at
2776.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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It is the ability to wield power, rather than the mere use of that
power, that the framers of the Constitution intended to distribute
among the three branches. The actual power assumed by Congress
in the creation of each legislative veto should be subject to consti-
tutional inspection. If Congress assumes a power that may be exer-
cised only by the executive or judicial branch, the separation of
powers doctrine has been violated. Conversely, if the power em-
bodied in the legislative veto is, in fact, legislative in character,
there would be no improper assumption, and no violation of the
doctrine. Only at this point does the exercise of that power become
important, as it relates to article I procedural standards.
Carl P. Izzo, Jr.

